CIA Outed by a Congress in Denial
A classified report , known as the Joint Inquiry Report (JI), from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the agency’s accountability leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks was made public on Tuesday. Blame for the Agency’s shortcomings is placed squarely on the shoulders of CIA director George Tenet. The declassification was brought about when congress passed a bill last month implementing elements of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations despite of the objections of current CIA Director Michael V. Hayden. Though limited in it’s scope the report paints a disturbing picture of a massive bureaucracy unable to identify and complete objectives necessary to secure the nation. What’s more disturbing is the report, produced pursuant to congressional request, comes up short when identifying the political culture developing within the agency in the years leading up to Tenet’s tenure as CIA chief.
The JI points out that while CIA officers “worked hard against al-Qa’ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets… neither the Government nor the Intelligence Community (IC) had a comprehensive strategy for combating al-Qa’ida.” George Tenet, then Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) stated “We are at war” in a December 1998 memorandum and wrote he wanted “… no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.” But the report states that “…no comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was created in response the DCI’s memorandum …” The report concludes that “the former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done.”
The JI is constricted to the time frame beginning in early 1998 to 9/11. It would seem the analysis should at least begin with the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and better reference events of the 1970’s when the Church Committee chose to review the activities of the agency, restrict it’s license to act independently and increase Congressional oversight. This is not to say any expansion of the time frame would uncover an excuse for George Tenet’s short comings but the broader view will show responsibility for the operational and political climate at the CIA falls to a much wider fraternity of policymakers and their neglect of these problems to this date.
Covert Action
In the Covert Action section of the JI it is stated that “… US policymakers had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998 and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the government had not removed the ban on assassination and did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa’ida.” Such clandestine activities were considered egregious by the Chuck Committee and the target of specific reforms.
In 1975 the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), aka the Church Committee, investigated intelligence gathering by the FBI and CIA as well as covert operations by the CIA including political assassination. The latter included attempts against Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, as well as President Kennedy’s conspiring with the Mafia to assassinate Fidel Castro. The hearings would bring about increased Congressional oversight and pressure President Ford into issuing Executive Order 11905 banning sanctioned assassinations of foreign leaders.
The JI does recognize the agency’s trepidations with targeting the terrorists: “Given the law, executive order, and past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist. The team believes this position was reasonable and correct.” Regardless of authority, the report concludes the ultimate failure “… lay not in the language and interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its covert action capabilities.” The agency couldn’t act on the intel.
Domestic Surveillance
From the 1950’s through the 1970’s the CIA was engaged in a multitude of activities that were deemed to exceed it’s charter. Excessive surveillance issues came to light in reports commissioned in 1973 by CIA director James R. Schlesinger in response to press reports of CIA involvement in Nixon’s Watergate Scandal. The report, which came to be know as the CIA’s “Family Jewels,” listed past transgressions and included the wiretapping of columnists approved by US Attorney General Robert Kennedy and surveillance of dissidents between 1967 and 1971. These reports were reviewed by the Church Commissions and were considered in the development of it’s recommendations, some of which would result in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) prescribing guidelines for physical and electronic surveillance.
The JI charges “that the CIA failed to attack UBL’s finances” with the Department of the Treasury. In light of the restrictions imposed during the 70’s they acknowledge “that bureaucratic obstacles and legal restrictions inhibited CIA’s partnership with the Department of the Treasury.” In the intervening period between the 70’s and 9/11 nothing would be done to account for mounting terrorist activities and the changes in communication and banking technologies. Drastic measures were finally taken after the attack when George W. Bush signed the Patriot Act into law on October 21, 2001.
Contorted Culture
George Tenet was sworn in as CIA director in 1997, the fifth director in only six years. The Clinton era was marked by the retirement of veteran agents and lax recruiting. The State Department dictated foreign policy which was guided more by a perceived moral compas than realities perceived by intelligence agencies. James Woolsey, a highly qualified conservative Democrat held the directorship from 1993 to 1995. President Clinton’s motivation in his selection of Woolsey was believed to be to assuage conservative critics. However, according to Woolsey he never had a one-on-one meeting with the President during his tenure. He explained to journalist Richard Mintner: “It wasn’t that I had a bad relationship with the president. It just didn’t exist.”
Clinton would replace Woolsey with John Deutch who held the directorship from May 10, 1995 to December 14, 1996. Born in Brussels, Belgium, Deutch had been Deputy Secretary of Defense prior to his appointment to CIA director. He pursued a policy of declassifying records of Cold War Era covert operations and placed constraints on “politically incorrect” agent recruitment seeking to diversify the agency by including more women and minorities. A May 19, 1995 article in MIT’s [where Deutch earned his PHd in Chemistry] “The Tech” exclaimed “Several female employees of the CIA have also strongly criticized the agency for mistreating women. Deutch has vowed that the CIA will take not part in immoral, illegal, or incompetent intelligence activities.” The previous week the “New York Time” praised Deutch for his “emphatic commitment to cleanse and redesign” the CIA by dismissing those involved in or those who fail to report abuses or misconduct.
Deutch would abruptly resign his directorship when it was discovered classified materials were kept on his laptop computers at home which were also connected to the Internet and easily compromised. Then at deputy director, George Tenet began an internal investigation of the security breach in January 1997. Later that year Tenet would become director. The matter was referred to the Justice Department where Janet Reno declined prosecution. Clinton would pardon Deutch on his last day in office.
There are a variety of cultural differences between the diverse elements of the Intelligence Community that the simple restructuring by Congress won’t overcome and ignoring events prior to 1998 simply won’t hide. But even more important is setting the direction for the agencies within the community. The CIA along with the military is often required to act where the fabric of society is torn by terrorists and military tyrants. To be effective they have to have a purpose other than political correctness or to be used as a political pawn. While George Tenet may have failed to deliver accurate intelligence preceding 9/11 or the the invasion of Iraq, the Congress that continually encroached on the stealth of the agency with every expanding oversight has lost sight of the functions the agency must fulfill. [ro_7]
January 29th, 2008 at 1:08 am
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